Abstract-We consider Delay Tolerant mobile adhoc Networks (DTN) with Byzantine nodes and a binary spraying policy. Under such conditions, nefarious packets may propagate and considerably disrupt performance. We use Network Coding (NC) in this context, with a known number of Byzantine nodes. Existing approaches have considered static networks and used end-to-end error-correction schemes with fixed rates, or cryptographic verification of individual packets. Owing to mobility, an adversarial node may have the same throughput to the receiver as the legitimate sender, thus precluding Byzantine NC error-correction schemes. Since we consider DTNs, opportunistic exchanges allow transmission of cryptographic keys from the source to only a fraction of nodes in a given time. Our protocol marries cryptographic key dissemination and error-correction to ensure message recovery at the receiver. We distribute keys to a sufficiently high proportion of non-Byzantine nodes, refered to as secure nodes, to limit the propagation of nefarious traffic which may have originated from Byzantine nodes or been coded with traffic from such nodes. Given the ensuing limited ability of the adversarial traffic, we are able to perform error-correction at the receiver. For large networks under uniform and stationary mobility model, we present an analysis of the probability of successful recovery with our protocol in terms of parameters such as proportion of secure nodes, the level of error-correcting redundancy we provide and the completion time until decoding is possible. We use the technique of Koetter and Kschischang in our error-correction scheme. We provide numerical results for different random and empirically-obtained mobility traces.
I. INTRODUCTION
Delay Tolerant Networks (DTN) are mobile adhoc networks (MANETs) with intermittent connections among nodes. This kind of network leverages nodes mobility to compensate for lack of instantaneous connectivity, owing to sparse node densities, with short communication ranges on each node. A possible data propagation path from the source to the destination is composed of multiple links, possibly established over different time instances. There has been a growing interest in such networks as they have the potential of providing many popular distributed services [1] - [2] .
We assume that the file to be transferred needs to be split into K packets: this occurs owing to the finite duration of contacts among mobile nodes or when the file is large with respect to the buffering capabilities of nodes. The message is considered to be well received if and only if all the K packets of the source are recovered at the destination.
Flooding data packets to all nodes in the network is the principle of epidemic routing [3] , meant to explore all opportunistic paths from the source to the destination, and achieving the shortest data transmission delay. However, this transmission policy consumes the highest amount of energy, which can be harmful for mobile nodes that are very likely to have limited energy resources. Other routing policies, like Spray and Wait [4] , [2] and probabilistic routing [5] , [6] , that balance efficiently protocol performance and energy consumption, have therefore been devised.
Randomized network coding [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] has attracted an increasing interest. Its benefits are increase in throughput, as well as adaptability to network topology changes and resilience to link failures. This is due to the fact that successful reception of information does not depend on receiving specific packet content, but on receiving a sufficient number of independent packets, thereby circumventing the coupon collector problem that would emerge with single repetition of packets. Indeed, various papers underline how beneficial it is to use network coding in DTNs [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] .
We consider a model of a DTN with unidentified Byzantine nodes. A binary spraying policy is used for packet dissemination, and we assume a uniform and stationary random mobility model. Opportunistic key distribution allows some nodes to verify the packets they receive, thereby becoming secure nodes. Our cryptographic scheme relies on packets integrity verified at secure nodes only, using a network-coding compatible homomorphic signature scheme. We thus obtain a bound on the effective pollution undergone by traffic. The remaining pollution is mitigated through network coding based error-correction approaches.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section I we present the state of the art and outline the major contributions of the paper. In Section II we describe the model of the system, detail the error-correction and signature schemes, then the protocol making possible the correction. In Section III we derive the main results on the protocol analysis. Section IV reports on simulation results in case of synthetic mobility and empirical traces. A concluding section ends this paper.
Related works
The authors of [15] , [16] and [17] address the vulnerability of content distribution systems using network coding. To thwart attacks by malicious nodes sending bad packets, they propose a signature scheme for network coding which is secure and allows nodes to check easily the integrity of the received packets. Ho et al. in [18] propose a scheme for detecting adversarial modifications in network using random linear network coding. This approach assumes that the packets headers are not polluted by the adversary, thereby allowing the destination to know the coding coefficients. Here, we consider the more general case where the whole coded packet can be polluted, even in the headers. In order to constrict the adversaries and prevent them from overwhelming the error-correction scheme, the authors of [19] introduce a broadcast-mode transformation of the network, which changes the multicast capacity of the network. However that method cannot apply to DTN because trusted gateways are required. In [20] , [21] , the problem of error-control in random linear network coding is considered. The construction of an error-correction coding scheme for network coding is described, and the conditions of successful decoding are proved.
Novel contributions
The main contribution of this paper is the design of a protocol which allows information-theoretic reliable communication under network coding in Delay Tolerant Adhoc networks with Byzantine adversaries. Our protocol marries cryptographic key dissemination and error-correction to ensure message recovery at the receiver.
A binary spraying policy is used for packet dissemination, and we assume a uniform and stationary random mobility model. We perform an analysis of the protocol performance, thereby providing guidelines to tune protocol parameters in terms of minimum recovery delay and energy consumption constraints entailed by the target applications. We show how the capacity of the secure channel scales with the number of nodes and is improved compared to a static network. Simulations are done to validate numerically the devised protocol and its analysis, as well as to test its robustness when the mobility models are not anymore perfectly matched by a real-world network.
To the best of our knowledge, no work has addressed the issue of data integrity protection in DTNs with network coding.
II. NETWORK MODEL
In this paper, we consider unicast communication from a source to a destination in a delay tolerant network with N wireless nodes, moving within a constrained area. The source has K packets to transmit to the destination. We assume that two nodes are able to communicate when they are within reciprocal radio range, and that communications are bidirectional. Furthermore, let the time between contacts of pairs of nodes be exponentially distributed with inter-meeting intensity λ. The validity of this model has been discussed in [22] , and its accuracy has been shown for a number of mobility models (Random Walker, Random Direction, Random Waypoint). Although the analysis of our protocol is based on this model, we evaluate its robustness under realistic mobility patterns by trace-based experiments. We assume that the transmitted message, made of the K packets of the source, is relevant during some time τ . We do not assume any feedback which allows the source or other mobiles to know whether the message has made it successfully to the destination within time τ . We assume that there is no background traffic beyond the unicast communication we consider.
We assume that the nodes in the network can authenticate each other by checking their pseudonyms when they meet, to decide whether they accept transmissions. At the beginning, the adversary is not able to authenticate itself, and hence to transmit. When the source sends its message, it adds its pseudonym in all the outgoing packets. Thus, it is sufficient for an adversarial node to get a packet in order to spoof the network. Then each node meeting the adversary will identify it as the source, not as a relay node.
Let "bandwidth" denotes the number of packets that can be sent in one direction between two meeting nodes. The protocol works for limited buffer size and bandwidth framework, though for the analysis we assume unlimited buffer size and bandwidth.
When random linear network coding is used in a network, each node makes random linear combinations of incoming packets. The resulting packets, called coded packets, are random linear combinations of the K information packets of the original message [10] . In each sent packet, a header is added to describe what are the coefficients of each information packet the coded packet results from. For each coded packet to be generated, the coefficients of the linear combination are chosen uniformly at random for each information packet, in the finite field of order q, F q . When no corrupted packet is introduced, i.e. packet which is not a linear combination of information packets, the recovery of the K information packets is possible at the destination if and only if the matrix made of the headers of all received packets has rank K. When errors (corrupted packets) are introduced and received by the destination, the recovery of the K information packets is not possible anymore if no additional error-correcting mechanism is implemented.
A. Coding for errors in random network coding
The error-correction scheme, presented by Koetter and Kschischang in [20] , is based on noticing that the recovery of the information packets at the receiver is possible as soon as any generating set of the space spanned by the information packets, called information space, is received. Hence, the corrupted packets introduced by the adverasry prevent from decoding the information packets as soon as they are not in the information space. The error-correction coding at the source is thus meant to choose what vector space has to be sent, rather than which vectors (packets).
Let W be a vector space over a finite field. A code with ambient space W is a nonempty collection of subspaces of W . The authors of [20] provide a Reed-Solomon-like code construction and decoding algorithm. We briefly describe the encoding technique in a simple way, and refer the reader to [20] for complete development. Let F = F q m be a finite extension field of F q . Let u = (u 0 , . . . , u k−1 ) denote a block of k information packets, each of size m over F q , hence u ∈ F. Let A = {α 1 , . . . , α l } ∈ F be a set of linearly independent elements in F. This means that each α i , i = 1, . . . , l, is a vector of m elements over F q . These elements span an l-dimensional vector space A ⊆ F over F q . We have l ≤ m. The considered ambient space, whose a subspace will correspond to a codeword, is the direct sum W = A ⊕ F = {(α, β) : α ∈ A , β ∈ F}, a vector space of dimension l + m over F q . The codeword V is then the vector subspace of W , whose a generating set is made of
(all operations are finite field operations, and [., .] denotes the concatenation of two row-vectors). Hence V is a subspace of W of dimension l.
With the decoder provided in [20] , the coding scheme has the following correction capability. Let U be the space received at the destination. U is a subspace of W , and let r be the dimension of U . Let ρ be defined by dim(U ∩ V ) = l − ρ. Let the subspace Z be the error-space: Z = U \(U ∩V ). We define t =dim(Z) = r − (l − ρ). In the remainder, l and t are referred to as the numbers of degrees of freedom (DoFs) of the source and the adversary, respectively. Furthermore, t stands for the min-cut capacity between the adversary and the destination, which, roughly, can be seen as the number of links polluted by the adversary. We refer the reader to [21] for a study of network capacities in the presence of Byzantine nodes. Then correction, i.e., full recovery of (u 0 , . . . , u k−1 ), is possible if and only if ([20] eq. (11))
For ease of notations we took the lower-case letters k and l. To avoid any confusion later on, we switch to K and L c , respectively.
B. Getting a non-zero capacity for the secure channel
When the adversary can eavesdrop on all links and pollute z 0 links, the optimal rate is C − 2z 0 [23] , [24] , [25] , where C is the network capacity as defined in [7] . The authors of [20] showed that their error-correcting coding scheme can achieve this optimal rate.
In the remainder, we call "secure channel" the virtual pointto-point channel between the source and the destination, over which the message can be sent and fully recovered at the destination. From the expression of C − 2z 0 , we can see that the capacity of the secure channel is non-zero if and only if the min-cut from the adversarial nodes to the destination is strictly lower than half the min-cut from the source to the destination. The first goal, in devising our protocol, is to ensure that the secure channel has non-zero capacity. In DTN, we cannot know, prior to communication, what are going to be the different opportunistic paths, from source and adversaries to the destination. For the sake of simplicity, let us first consider that there is only one adversarial node in the network. The extension to several adversarial nodes is straightforward and will be discussed later. We consider a network model where each and every node has the same probability to meet another node at each instance of time. When there is one adversarial node, within a given time, the adversarial node has thus the same probability to get the same number of links to the destination as the source has. In that case, the capacity of the secure channel is zero. This is the reason why, in order to get non-zero capacity for the secure channel by another means than authentication, since we assume that the adversary uses the identity of the source, we need to make some nodes able to detect and to not relay the adversary packets. To do so, we are going to use the signature scheme for content distribution with network coding, presented by Zhao et al. in [15] . This is a homomorphic signature scheme that allows nodes to verify any linear combinations of pieces without contacting the original sender. As previously introduced, the vectors that are sent over the network, after error-correction encoding, are v j in F l+m q , j = 1, . . . , l. They are the generating set of V . A received packet is a valid linear combination if and only if it belongs to V . We briefly describe the approach of [15] .
Let p be a large prime such that q is a divisor of p−1. Let g be a generator of the group of order q in F p . We consider the random set of elements in F * p : K pr = {a i } i=1,...,l+m , which is the private key. As well, let
..,l+m denote the public key. The scheme works as follows:
• The source finds a vector y that is orthogonal to all vectors in V .
• The source computes vector x = (y 1 /a 1 , . . . , y l+m /a m+n ).
• The source signs x with some standard signature scheme and publishes it.
• When a node, that has received the public key, receives a vector w and wants to verify that w is in V , it computes
and verifies that d = 1. Zhao et al. in [15] showed that it is as hard as the Discrete Logarithm problem to find new vectors that also satisfy the verification criterion other than those in V . In a network, if the public key K pu is received by all the nodes, no correction is needed as it is impossible for an adversarial node to pollute any link. However, in Delay Tolerant Adhoc Networks, as we do not know what nodes are going to take part in the opportunistic paths for the upcoming transmission, we cannot be sure that all those nodes will get the public key prior to transmission. As well, owing to the motion of nodes that may be spread over a wide area, with high inter-meeting time, we cannot expect that all the nodes of the network will get the public key prior to transmission within a reasonable time.
To face this situation, our protocol proceeds as follows: the public key K pu is sent to enough nodes, referred to as "secure nodes" hereafter, so as to ensure non-zero capacity of the secure channel, then error-correction coding is used to reach that capacity.
C. The protocol for attack-resilient transmissions
As spraying policy, we consider the Spray and Wait policy [2] that is known to achieve efficient trade-off between message delay and number of replicas in case of a single message. In the remainder, a coded source packet refers to any packet in V , which is the vector space obtained from information packets after error-correction coding. Each coded source packet is disseminated to M random nodes in the network. M is the max spray counter. Each node in the network performs random linear combinations of the packets in its buffer to send out coded packets. Under a uniform and stationary random mobility model such as ours, Spyropoulos et al. [2] have shown that the overall performance of Binary Spray and Wait is close to the optimal scheme: M allows to balance average message delivery delay and number of transmissions, i.e., energy.
The inputs of our protocol are:
• the K information packets, of length m each, the message is made of • L c which denotes the dimension of the error-correction coded vector space. From [20] we must have K ≤ L c < m • τ is the time-to-live of the message • N s the number of nodes that have to receive the public key for the message recovery to be possible at the destination by time τ • λ the estimated inter-meeting intensity • M the maximum number of copies of a given coded source packet • Q the maximum spray counter all nodes saturate the incoming packets to Let S, D and A denote the source, destination and adversarial nodes, respectively. The protocol proceeds as follows:
• The source S encodes the K information packets into the vector space V of dimension L c , as described in Section II-A. L c vectors generating V are made available at the source.
• From those L c vectors, the source generates the private and public keys K pr and K pu .
• N s copies of the public key must be disseminated, which is achieved by the Binary Spray and Wait policy. Either we assume some feedback that allows the source to know whether the public key has made it successfully to N s nodes, or we assume the homogeneous random motion under which the average number of time slots for N s copies to disseminate is ⌈log 2 (N s )⌉, where a time slot lasts in average 1 λN (details in the next section). It is thus sufficient to wait slightly larger that a time of
for the number of secure nodes to be sufficiently close to N s . How much longer than that time we have to wait is dependent on the fitting of the homogeneous random mobility model to the real network.
• S to any node but A and D
The source starts to transmit packets in V . It has L c packets to transmit. Each node maintains a spray list i, s i corresponding to the packets and their number of copies in its buffer. At the beginning, the spray list of S is such that i = 1, . . . , L c and s i = 1 for all i. Each packet carries its index i and spray counter s i , and i, s i is added to the spray list of the node which receives that packet. When the source S meets a node R which is not the destination and has a different identity than the source, it checks its spray list, and if there is i in S with s i = 1 that R has not, S sends a coded source packet to R, otherwise S skips the transmission opportunity. In the packet it sends to R, S sets the index to i and the spray counter to M . S updates its spray counter of i to s i = 0.
• A to any node but S We consider that the adversary has the most harmful behavior for the communication between the source and the destination. The goal of the adversary is, given the Binary Spray and Wait policy, to disseminate as many corrupted packets as possible. As soon as the adversary eavesdrops one coded source packet from any node, it is able to take the identity of the source, and to pass itself off as the source. From that point, when the adversary A meets any other node R, which can be the destination but not the source, two cases arise. The first possibility is that R is a secure node, i.e., it has the public key K pu , and it is hence able to detect the adversary and to reject the corrupted packet. The second possibility is that R does not have K pu , and accepts only one packet from A because it identifies A as the source. The adversary sends a packet that does not belong to V . If the index of the sent packet is one of the index of the spray list of R, R is going to reject the packet. Hence, for the packet it sends, the adversary is going to choose one index of the source coded packets, i.e., from 1 to L c , that is not in the spray list of R, and wants to put the spray counter as high as possible, in order to infect the highest number of nodes. However, we can clearly consider that all nodes saturate the spray counter of packets they receive to a certain value. Let Q denote this maximum value. A stores the index it sended to not send it again in the future, in order to maximize the propagation of its packets. For each corrupted packet, at most Q will be disseminated in the network.
• A to S When the adversary A and the source S meet, S neither accepts nor sends any packet, because A fails to autenticate: S detects the identity of A, which is its, and hence knows that A is an ennemy.
• Any node R 1 but S, D and A, to any node R 2 but S, D and A Recall that B s is the buffer size of nodes and B d is the bandwith, i.e., the number of packets that can be exchanged from one node to another when they are in the same radio range. When two relay nodes R 1 and R 2 meet, amongst the indexes in the spray list of R 1 that are not in the spray list of R 2 , R 1 sends to R 2 at most B d coded packets with those indexes if the spray counters of these packets are at least 2. Each packet sent by R 1 is a random linear combination of all the packets in its buffer. In each packet sent with index i, R 1 sets the spray counter to s i = ⌊ si 2 ⌋. R 1 updates the spray counters of these indexes i to s i = ⌈ si 2 ⌉ in its own spray list. Upon reception of each packet, R 2 stores the new packet in its buffer if there are less than B s packets already stored. If there are already B s packets in the buffer, R 2 makes a random linear combination of the received packet with all other packets in its buffer, drops a packet already present in its buffer and stores the linear combination. Then the same process occurs for R 2 transmitting to R 1 .
• Any node R but S and A to D When any relay node R, different of A and S, meets the destination D, it sends it all the packets it has, in the limit of B d packets.
• S and A to D Exactly one packet is sent from S or A to D.
III. ANALYSIS OF PROTOCOL PERFORMANCE
In this section, we analyze the interplay among parameters of the devised protocol, and how they affect cost functions such as delay, probability of successful recovery and energy.
From now on, we use some notations and steps similar to those introduced by Lin et al. in [14] . First, T slot denotes the time slot, which is the random time duration between two consecutive meetings between a node and two other nodes. The expected length of a time slot is given by
For ease of analysis, we consider that the time is discretized over time slots. If an event occurs at time t, then we assume the corresponding time slot is n = λN t. This assumption is reasonable when the mobility model is homogeneous and stationsary. Let L(n) (resp. T (n)) denote the number of DoFs of the source (resp. the adversary) the destination has received at time slot n. Let P s (τ ) denote the probability of successful message recovery at the destination by time τ . Then
The goal in this section is to express P s (τ ) in terms of the protocol parameters. In this section, we assume that the buffer size B s and the bandwidth B d are infinite, which facilitates our analysis of spreading of DoFs both from the source and from the adversary. Let p n,j (resp. q n,j ) denote the probability that DoF j of the source (resp. adversary) be received at the destination by time slot n. Let L (s)
n,j ) be the number of nodes that have the jth source (resp. adversary) DoF at time slot n. So we can express p n,j and q n,j :
The first expression is obtained by noting that each time the source meets a node, i.e. at each time slot, it sends a packet to this node. The second expression takes into account that, in average, the adversary manages to give a packet to a node every N N −Ns time slots. Let P c (t) be the probability that the recovery is successful at time t exactly. P s (τ ) = 1 if and only if it exists t ≤ τ such that P c (t) = 1. Let E be any set made of pairwise different elements from a specified set. Let |E| be the cardinality of E. Then by developing eq. (1), we get:
(1 − p n,j ) .
Instead of studying and optimizing eq. (4), we rather consider the asymptotic case, i.e., the limit case when the number N of nodes in the network tends to infinity. This simpler way to optimize the protocol allows to get interpretations of the results, and gives good guidelines on how choosing the protocol parameters for moderate and high numbers of nodes in the network, as illustrated in Section IV. Let us assume that K, L c and N s grow as functions of N . In the following theorem, we identify how the parameters must scale with N to ensure high success probability. 
To study the limit of P s (τ ) when N tends to infinity, we want to express
in terms of l; we have n = λτ N → ∞, which is consistent since when the number of nodes increases, the number of time slots increases linearly within a certain time. The Strong Law of Large Numbers [26] ensures that, if X n is the sample average of n independent but not identically distributed random variables, then
provided that each X k has finite second moment and
is a sum of independent non-identically distributed random variables X k , each taking value 1 if DoF k from the source has been received at the destination by time slot n, 0 otherwise. These random variables are independent because we assume infinite bandwidth and buffer size, and not identically distributed because the DoFs are sent at different time slots. Therefore we have, by the Strong Law of Large Numbers:
The exact distribution P (L(n) = l) is expressed in the first squared bracket of eq. (4). However, to get a closed form of E[L(n)], we approximate the distribution P (L(n) = l) by a binomial distribution. The corresponding binomial random variable is the sum of independent identically distributed Bernoulli random variables. Let (p 1 , . . . , p n ) denote the probability of n independent Bernoulli random variables. Let X be the sum of these n random variables, then
Let B denote the binomial random variable which is the sum of n independent identically distributed Bernoulli variables all of parameter p = 1 n n j=1 p j , then
The distributions of X and B are the same only when all p j , j = 1, . . . , n, are all the same. We verify numerically that when the p j are different, the distributions of X and B are very close when (i) l is close to n and (ii) no p j is 0. Thus, under certain conditions, we can approximate the distribution of L(n) by a binomial distribution with parameter p(n): k,j , are not constant when N grows to infinity. Let us now study p n,j . Since in average ⌈log 2 (M )⌉ time slots are necessary to disseminate M copies of a DoF, we have
From those inequalities, we get (see proof in Appendix of [27] ) lim N →∞ p(n) = 1 as soon asL c > 0, and M and Q grows with N , but not necessarily linearly (e.g., M and/or Q can be O(log(N ))). Thus
Let S =dim(W ) = L c + m be the dimension of the ambient space (according to Section II-A), i.e., the space any packet in the network belongs to. Thus S − L c = m is the maximum number of harmful DoFs the adversary can send (the other DoFs will belong to V and will hence help the transmission). Same developments are done for the adversary, with
and by approximating the distribution of T (n) with a binomial distribution of parameter q(n):
Clearly, the correction is not possible in the first case. By definition, m = S − L c (see Section II-A). For a possible correction at time t, it is thus necessary to choose m such that m > λ(N − N s )t. In the same way as for the source, we obtain
Since the limits of expectations tend to the maximum value of the corresponding random variables, we assume that (i) is fulfilled for both the source and the adversary. We express the limit case of the successful recovery condition
We get in the asymptotic regime, whenN s >K Lc : . Thus, the higher N s , the earlier full message recovery can be made. As well, the higherN s and/or the higherL c , the longer the time when correction is possible. The lower-bound t min depends only on N s , λ andK. λ andK are given by the network and the message to transmit, respectively. OnceN s is chosen in terms of desired t min ,L c can be chosen such that:
≥ τ in order to still have possible recovery until τ . In the reminder, L c verifying this condition is called "minimum L c for τ ".
We can see that the higherL c , the better for successful recovery probability. However, increasingL c comes at the expense of error-correction coding and decoding complexity. Indeed, the decoding complexity scales in O(m(L c + m)
2 ) [20] , and we must have m > L c . When choosing L c , it is therefore important to determine the desired trade-off between correction capability and computational resource requirements.
Remark 1: The lower-bound t min is only for the transmission time, and does not account for the time spent in distributing the public key, prior to message transmission. N s copies of the public key K pu are disseminated, in average, in ⌈log 2 (N s )⌉ time slots of length 1 λN . Then, for large but finite N , the minimum duration for successful recovery, from the time the source starts to transmit the public key, can be approximated by
This function t minK (N s ) is convex, and hence can be minimized by properly choosing N s . The choice of N s depends only on the network parameters λ and N , and K. It is worth noting that, in the asymptotic regime, lim
Remark 2: As M and Q represent the number of transmissions per packet sent by the source and adversary, respectively, we can check that, even in this adversarial context, the number of transmissions can scale as ⌈log(K)⌉. When there is no adversary, Lin et al. [14] proved that this is the minimum spray counter in order for the destination to decode all K source packets thanks to any K coded packets with high probability. Furthermore, there is no lower-bound on M in terms of Q. By definition of Q, we only have M ≤ Q. Thus, in the limit case of N , the energy consumption affects the successful recovery probability only throughN s for the key distribution andL c for the coding and decoding complexity.
Remark 3: Thus,N s >K Lc is the only necessary and sufficient condition onN s for a time t at which P c (t) = 1 to exist. That ratio is connected to the error-correcting code rate
Thus, the minimum fraction of secure nodes to ensure feasible transmission is given by the code rate:
g(x) = 1. It is worth noting that, for the overhead due to coding to tend to zero, L c /m must tend to zero [20] . When L c /m tends to zero, then L b ∼ R. This means that, in the limit case of N , the normalized capacity of the secure channel is C =N s . To get C > 0, it is thus sufficient to haveN s > 0. The naive approach of applying methods for fixed networks [24] to mobile networks, gives capacity N − 2(N − N s ), i.e., C = 2N s − 1, and hence requiresN s > 1 2 to get C > 0. Hence, unlike in fixed networks, in DTNs, the delay for nodes to meet each other must be accounted for in the determination of min-cut to compute the capacity of the secure channel. This aspect is part of our future objectives.
Corollary 3.1: When there are A > 1 adversarial nodes, the conditions on protocol parameters to get lim N →∞ P s (τ ) = 1, and still have possible recovery until τ , are the same as above, except for:
The only change is that within t, λ(N −N s )At DoFs of the adversary can be sent by those A nodes. Thus
Therefore we obtain, in the asymptotic regime and whenN s > K ALc
The lower-bound onN s grows with A and stays lower than 1 as soon asK Lc < 1.
IV. NUMERICAL VALIDATION
The goal of this section is to validate numerically the devised protocol and its analysis, as well as testing its robustness when the model is not perfectly matched anymore by a realworld network. Our experiments are trace based; message recovery is simulated by a Matlab script receiving as input pre-recorded contact traces.
A. Synthetic mobility
To first validate the protocol, we use a Random Waypoint (RWP) mobility model [28] . We use two contact traces registered with Omnet++ with N = 100 and N = 200 nodes, inter-meeting intensities λ = 1.054.10 −5 s −1 and λ = 9.091.10 −6 s −1 , respectively. The simulations are based on counting the DoFs of the source and adversary disseminated in the network. Thus we neglect the impact the finite field size q may have on linear dependencies. In all simulations, we assume that the public key has already been received by N s secure nodes prior to the transmission. For ease of analysis of curves, in all simulations, we consider that there is only one adversarial node. Thus, without our protocol, the adversary has the same capacity as the source to reach the destination.
In Figures 1(a) and 1(b) , the minimum L c for message recovery until τ = 50000s is plotted in terms of the number of secured nodes N s . By message recovery, we mean that the ratio between the successful recoveries and the number of the 50 independent random source-destination-adversary triplet experiments is above 0.9. We can see that the fit with the minimum value of L c , predicted by the analytical formula λτ (N −N s )+K and derived in the previous section, improves as N increases.
In Figure 2 (a), the message recovery time is plotted in terms of N s . Dashed curves correspond to the lower-bound on time t min = K λNs , derived in the previous section. We can see that the decrease of the recovery time got from simulations, with N s growing, is smaller than the decrease of the analytical lower-bound. We interpret this by: in a framework with finite number of nodes, it may be not optimal for the recovery time to increase N s too much, even though it allows to have lower L c , because increasing N s also diminishes the relaying of source DoFs (as soon as they have been mixed up with adversary DoFs). This can be harmful for the delay for enough source DoFs to reach the destination.
Let us now see how a deviation of a real-world system, from the model we assume, affects protocol performance. Amongst the possible deviations, the obvious one is the limited buffer size and limited bandwidth due to, e.g, the limited contact time of two meeting mobile nodes. Indeed the analysis of Section III, from which the protocol parameters are chosen, assumes unlimited buffer size and unlimited bandwidth. The analytical analysis of the protocol performance with limited buffer size B s and bandwidth B d is left to future work, but we ran simulations to get an insight on how B s and B d affect the results predicted by Section III. In Figure 2( When a node has to send out packets, it sends at most B d random linear combinations of the packets in its buffer. When a node receives a packet, it stores it in its buffer if the buffer is not full yet, otherwise it makes a random linear combination of the received packet with the packets in its buffer, and drops one of the already present packets to store the result. Thus, we can roughly say that the buffer size limits what (number of DoFs, i.e. of information content) goes in the node, while the bandwidth limits what goes out.
Hence, when N s is small, the limited buffer size is as harmful for the dissemination of source DoFs as for adversary DoFs, because "equalization" performed between DoFs owing to buffer size does not change a lot the already quite equal amounts of source and adversary DoFs. Hence there is no big difference in required L c between B s = 15 and B s = 5.
When N s gets larger, the number of source DoFs which have not been mixed up with adversary DoFs increases. Thus, the higher B s , the more those DoFs can go through unsecure relay nodes without being mixed up with the adversary DoFs, thereby preserving the advantage from high N s , and requiring lower L c than a smaller B s does (less "equalization" between adversary and source DoFs is done owing to small B s ).
When N s is small, limited B d helps to impede the dissemination of source and adversary DoFs in unsecure nodes, thereby helping (giving more time slots to) secure nodes to relay source DoFs, and hence giving advantage to the source.
When N s gets larger, source DoFs are already enough relayed in the network for a higher bandwidth to be not harmful in helping also the adversary.
B. Empirical traces
The experimental trace on which we test our protocol is taken from [29] , and corresponds to users wearing Bluetoothenabled iMotes at Infocom 2005. The number of effective nodes is 21. The successful probability P s (τ ) is plotted in Figure 3 for τ = 200000s, in terms of L c for various N s .
The two sets of curves, which stem from L c = 5 and L c = 10, correspond to K = 5 and K = 10, respectively. Vertical lines correspond to the lower-bound K Ns N on L c (see Section III), plotted for each N s for K = 5. First, it is obvious that P s (τ ) is zero for any L c < K. Then we can see that the threshold on L c , corresponding to the vertical lines, gives a successful probability higher than 0.5, which means that the analysis which allows to choose the protocol parameter is still helpful for networks of moderate size. However, this is clearly dependent on the uniformity and stationarity of the inter-meeting intensities.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a protocol addressing the issue of protecting data integrity for network coding based transmissions in DTNs, where unidentified Byzantine nodes pollute traffic. Our protocol combines cryptographic key dissemination and error-correction to ensure message recovery at the receiver. We perform an analysis of the protocol performance in terms of protocol parameters such as the fraction of nodes that must receive the key and the amount of error-correction redundancy needed, allowing to choose the parameters according to constraints on the delay of information recovery and energy. Simulations have validated numerically the devised protocol and its analysis, and we have also tested it on empirical traces. Thus we have p(n) = p (C) (n) with C = n (resp. C = L c ) when L c > n (resp. L c ≤ n). With the upper-bound on p n,j in eq. (6), we get 
As well as above, we easily show that lim N →∞ B u = 1 when C = n or C = L c . The development to get the limit of the lower-bound on p(n) is the same, except that n is replaced by n − log 2 (M ). As well, the steps are also the same to prove that the lower and upper bounds on q(n) for the adversary tends to 1.
